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La Albufera wetland in the Jucar Basin.
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Global water resources face new challenges in the coming decades that entail a renewed
role  for  water  policy  analysis.  Scarcity,  growing  populations,  and  massive  water
development projects have led to keen competition over water resources. Climate change is
expected to further reduce the availability of water resources and increase the variability in
water supplies in some regions, especially in arid and semiarid basins. While emerging
social  demands  for  the  protection  of  water  dependent-ecosystems  are  increasing
competition  for  already  scarce  water  resources.
Under  these  circumstances,  the  efficient  and  fair  allocation  of  water  among  users  is
becoming a major challenge for water authorities. New water allocation mechanisms based
on the involvement of stakeholders are needed.
Several policy responses have been suggested in the literature to address climate change
impacts.  However,  the  existing  literature  usually  overlooks  one  important  aspect  that
determines the success of  policy interventions;  the strategic behavior of  the individual
stakeholders. The inclusion of strategic behavior is essential for assessing the acceptability
and stability of policy interventions aimed at promoting the joint management of water
resources. In a recent study, Kahil et al. (2015) have addressed this gap by developing a
cooperative  game  theory  (CGT)  framework  at  a  basin  scale1.  Several  CGT  sharing
mechanisms and stability indexes have been used to find efficient and fair allocations of
water and income among river water users under various climate change scenarios.
CGT and water resources
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The use of game theory to address water management problems has been growing since the
pioneer application by Ransmeier (1942) to an investment cost allocation problem in the
Tennessee Valley Authority2.  In particular,  CGT models were developed and have been
applied to various aspects of water management in the literature, such as decisions on cost
and benefit allocation in water projects, efficient sharing of river systems, joint management
of  aquifers,  pollution  control,  operation  of  hydropower  facilities,  and  resolution  of
transboundary water conflicts3.
CGT deals with games in which stakeholders (players) choose to cooperate by forming
coalitions and sharing fairly the benefits from those coalitional arrangements. CGT favors
agreements that include all possible players (grand coalition) and it provides several benefit
sharing mechanisms. These mechanisms reveal different possible societal understanding of
fairness. The purpose of CGT is to find the incentives for cooperation among stakeholders in
order to achieve economically efficient outcomes for the coalitions. The advantage of using
CGT compared to conventional optimization models is its ability to address both efficiency
and equity principles, which promotes acceptable and stable cooperative outcomes.
Application of CGT to basin management in Spain
A  CGT  framework  has  been  developed  and  applied  to  a  typical  semiarid  basin  in
Southeastern  Spain,  the  Jucar  basin,  which  is  a  good  case  for  studying  the  strategic
behavior of stakeholders and policies to address climate change impacts. The Jucar River is
under severe stress with acute water scarcity, and substantial ecosystem degradation. The
framework consists of a three-step process.
First,  an optimization model  is  developed to  assess  the outcomes of  alternative  water
allocation  policies:  non-cooperative  policy,  cooperative  policy  1  which  disregards  the
environmental  benefits  provided  by  an  important  aquatic  ecosystem in  the  basin  (the
Albufera wetland), and cooperative policy 2 which accounts for the environmental benefits
provided by the Albufera wetland. Cooperative policies aim to allocate water efficiently
among the various players.
If additional benefits are obtained from the cooperative policy interventions compared to
non-cooperation, the next step consists of redistributing the additional benefits among the
cooperating players using CGT sharing mechanisms (e.g., Shapley Value, Nash-Harsanyi,
Nucleolus), and testing whether these redistributions are acceptable for the players or not.
Acceptability is defined using the so-called Core conditions of a cooperative game, which
compare the benefits obtained by each cooperating player under the grand coalition to what
each player can obtain under non-cooperation, or by participating in partial coalitions that
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include some and not all the players in the game.
Table 1. Benefits (M), acceptability and
stability of policy interventions under a
very severe climate change scenario.
Source: Kahil et al. (20150
The last step consists of testing the stability of the acceptable cooperative solutions using
some of  the  methods  suggested  in  the  CGT literature.  This  is  important  because  the
acceptability of a solution does not guarantee its stability as some players may find it
relatively unfair compared to other solutions or to what other players have obtained. They
might threaten to leave the grand coalition, and act individually or form partial coalitions
because of their critical position in the grand coalition. The stability of any solution is
important given the existence of considerable fixed investments and transaction costs, so
that a more stable solution might be preferred even if it is harder to implement.
Results and policy implications
The results of this study provide clear evidence that achieving cooperation reduces climate
change  impacts  on  water  resources  (Table  1).  However,  cooperation  may  have  to  be
regulated by public agencies, such as a basin authority, when scarcity is very high, in order
to protect ecosystems and maintain economic benefits. This is the case in the scenario of
cooperative policy 2, when environmental damages are internalized through the inclusion of
the wetland in the cooperative agreement.
Additionally, the results highlight the fact that various cooperative solutions have different
outcomes in terms of their acceptability to the players and their stability. This finding has
important policy implications, because it demonstrates the difficulties in selecting a mix of
policy instruments that could address climate change impacts, and the risk of policy failure.
Finally, the results show the importance of incorporating the strategic behavior of water
stakeholders through the use of CGT tools for the design of acceptable and stable basin-
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wide climate change adaptation policies.
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